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Failure to Flourish: How Law Undermines Family Relation-
ships. By Clare Huntington. Oxford and New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press. 2014. Pp. xix, 320. $45.
Introduction
There is something audacious at the heart of Clare Huntington’s Failure
to Flourish.1 She insists that the state exists to ensure that families flourish.
Not just that they survive, or not starve, or be able, somehow, to make ends
meet—but that they flourish. She demands this not just for some families
but, importantly, for all families. This simple, bold, and profoundly
countercultural demand allows Huntington to make a tremendously con-
vincing case that the state can begin to do precisely that. Failure to Flourish is
a brave, rigorously produced, carefully researched, and politically astute
book. Huntington seeks to persuade a wide swath of the American political
landscape, and at every turn she chooses her words carefully to accomplish
that end. This is an ambitious effort, and we would all be much better off if
it succeeds.
In one of the most ambitious features of the book, Huntington attempts
to transcend class, race, and gender boundaries. Although she is tremen-
dously nuanced in dealing with the complexities of this endeavor, Hunting-
ton ultimately seeks universality. As a scholar dedicated to issues of poverty,
I have no doubt that any restructuring of the relationship between poor
families and the state will fare better if it is tightly anchored to universal
solutions. The history of U.S. social-welfare policy teaches all too well that,
when legal structures are targeted at the poor, structural racism, classism,
and intersectional manifestations of gender bias raise their ugly heads. So we
need something that is hard to get—we need universal solutions that take
into account the differences in how legal institutions function across race,
class, and gender. Ultimately, I applaud this book as a major contribution to
the discussion of how the law must treat and support families and children,
but I differ with Huntington in a few instances where she does not ade-
quately account for the ways that legal institutions function in poor commu-
nities in general and poor communities of color in particular.
This Review proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
book, outlining its main arguments. Part II turns to the question of poverty
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. Clare Huntington is a Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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and describes central features of the current relationship between poor com-
munities and the state as hyperregulatory, which means that the mechanisms
of social support “are targeted by race, class, gender, and place to exert puni-
tive social control over poor, African-American women, their families, and
their communities.”2 Part III then suggests that, rather than reject rights in
child-welfare proceedings and beyond, Huntington’s project might be more
beneficial for those in poverty if we embrace a robust conception of rights.
This Part acknowledges that, for those in poverty, our current constitutional
jurisprudence confers neither any significant protection against rights viola-
tions nor a right to support. Nevertheless, Part III argues that a framework
emphasizing rights allows us to see, in the interstitial cracks of our statutory
schema and in daily fights on the ground for help and dignity, some glim-
mers of this more robust conceptualization of rights. Finally, this Part high-
lights the many ways in which Huntington’s project challenges race, gender,
and class privilege. In light of these challenges, this Review argues that, in
addition to asserting vigorously rights that exist, we need to push forward in
the project of theorizing a more robust conception of rights. Building on the
work of Dorothy Roberts and Martha Fineman, Part III concludes by
describing such a rights theory.
I. Failure to Flourish
Failure to Flourish offers a searing indictment of the relationship be-
tween legal institutions and families in America. Huntington’s central thesis
is that the “broad system of family law—both in resolving familial disputes
and in setting the structural framework for family life—fails to nurture the
strong, stable, positive relationships that are the key to individual and socie-
tal flourishing” (p. xii). This critique applies to two separate categories of
law. The first category is dispute-resolution family law—the legal processes by
which individuals become families and restructure their relationships (p.
xii). The second category, which Huntington labels structural family law,
includes some topics that are likely to appear on a family-law course’s sylla-
bus and other topics that are not (p. xii). In the first category are laws about
who comprises a family (with gay marriage being the central contested cate-
gory) and rules about “what family members owe one another” (p. xii).
Structural family law also reaches more broadly, extending into areas of the
law that profoundly affect the ability of families to function well. Legal rules
and institutions relating to zoning, employment discrimination, taxation,
and social-welfare and criminal-justice policy all fall within structural family
law (p. xii).
This book starts not in law but in science, offering extensive evidence
that strong family relationships are crucial to “child development, adult
well-being, health, healing, and the acquisition of social capital” (p. 7).
2. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty and Support, 25
Yale J.L. & Feminism 319, 322 (2014); see also Kaaryn S. Gustafson, Cheating Welfare:
Public Assistance and the Criminalization of Poverty 1 (2011).
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Drawing on positive psychology, Huntington shows that the ability of fami-
lies to nurture children, from their earliest moments, will have a long-term
effect on brain development. When positive nurturing and secure attach-
ment are absent, children’s development can be negatively affected, often for
the long term (pp. 7–8). Toxic stress, in the form of “abuse, neglect, extreme
poverty, and maternal clinical depression,” negatively impacts brain devel-
opment (p. 8). And negative attachments often mean that kids and future
adults will lag behind in important ways. Crucially for Huntington’s later
endorsement of programs that intervene early in family life, all of this hap-
pens very, very early—during the first months and years of children’s lives
(p. 8).
Having laid this groundwork, Huntington ventures boldly into the polit-
ically dangerous topic of how family structure affects children. She begins by
cataloguing changes in the structure of American families and then turns to
the question of impact (pp. 27–31). Her data-rich conclusions raise chal-
lenges for actors across the political spectrum. On gay marriage she is defini-
tive. There is no credible evidence to suggest that children parented by two
people of the same sex do any worse than children with opposite-sex par-
ents. In fact, these children thrive (p. 34). Moreover, “[t]here is overwhelm-
ing evidence that children raised by single or cohabitating parents have
worse outcomes than children raised by married, biological parents” (p. 31).
So do children exposed to high-conflict divorces and children whose fathers
fade out of the picture after divorce (pp. 33–34).
After demonstrating the correlation between family structure and child
development, Huntington turns to the complicated issue of causation. She
acknowledges that single parents are also more likely to be young, poor, and
less educated (p. 35). Her question for social policy then becomes whether
“the problem [is] having a single parent or having a low-income, young, less
educated parent” (p. 35). Huntington presents data that strongly suggest that
the problem is twofold. Age, poverty, and education matter, but relation-
ships matter as well. Even in the face of stress, children do better when their
parents can successfully raise them together (pp. 42–44). The question for
social policy, though, is whether to focus on the families, the circumstances,
or both. Huntington’s answer is that we must do both—we must address the
structural issues that exacerbate these risks and restructure legal institutions
to support families (pp. 54, 115).
Having established the serious challenges facing American families,
Huntington takes on a central myth of American law: that families are au-
tonomous from the state (p. 58). She definitively debunks two related auton-
omy myths. First, she dispels the notion that any family operates apart from
the state, and, second, she disputes the notion that only poor families de-
pend on the state for support. In fact, Huntington maintains, all families are
intertwined and interdependent.
To debunk the myth that families operate apart from the law, Hunting-
ton presents an extraordinary catalogue of the ways that law impacts families
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(pp. 59–68). Law determines what groupings are entitled to be a family (het-
erosexual couples, yes; lesbian and gay couples, well, it depends). Law deter-
mines how one enters and exits families. Law also structures families’ ability
to flourish (or not). Consider, for example, employment law. The ability to
make a living wage (or not) profoundly impacts the ability of a family to
provide strong parenting. So does the availability (or not) of paid parental
leave, subsidized child care, and health insurance. The extraordinary polic-
ing, prosecution, and incarceration of poor black men and women all pro-
foundly impact their ability to parent. Law and legal institutions make all of
these rules. In the face of this pervasive state presence, it is easy to see that
the idea of families as independent of the state is largely a myth.
On the issue of support, Huntington builds on the work of Suzanne
Mettler to establish that a far greater range of families receives state support
than popular discourse suggests or that families themselves actually realize
(p. 72). Mettler surveyed families to find out if they believed they receive
governmental assistance (p. 72). Fifty-seven percent responded that they had
not received such assistance (p.72). When the same survey respondents were
asked if they had ever received aid from twenty-one particular assistance
programs, however, 92% indicated that they had (p. 72). One explanation
for this striking disparity lies in differences in programmatic design (which
are, of course, the product of law and regulation). For example, some pro-
grams are “submerged” (p. 72). Although people receive benefits from them,
the programs are administered in a way that makes recipients less likely to
perceive those benefits as support. Contrast, for example, the home-mort-
gage or child-care deduction with benefits under Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (colloquially welfare). To get the deductions, you mark a box
and either write a smaller check or receive a bigger refund. To get welfare,
you go down to an office and subject yourself to an experience that Kaaryn
Gustafson terms ritual degradation.3 Each is a governmental benefit, but the
administrative structures and the social messages contained within those
structures could not be more different.
Using her well-established case for pervasive state regulation and com-
prehensive state support, Huntington cogently counters voices from the
Right and the Left. She dismisses both Charles Murray’s brand of derogatory
libertarianism and conservative rhetoric about the problem of welfare “de-
pendence” for failing “to account for the inevitable role of the state in family
life” (p. 77) and also for failing “to account for the substantial governmental
support received by those at the top of the economic ladder” (p. 78). Then
she speaks to the Left. “Whether liberals want to admit it or not, the rela-
tionship between adults affects children” (p. 80). The goal, then, is not to
keep the law out of families but to discern “how best to redirect this perva-
sive state so that it encourages strong, stable, positive relationships within
the family” (p. 80).
3. Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low-Income
Women, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 297 (2013).
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Family law, as Huntington broadly defines it, utterly fails to meet this
challenge. As to the dispute-resolution system, adversarialism of the kind
that works in corporate law or tort cases exacerbates conflict and under-
mines the ability to maintain strong relationships in the future. In both our
child-welfare and social-welfare systems, we provide very little assistance to
families in crisis, and we offer that assistance “only after the family has come
to the attention of the authorities and is deemed to be at risk of abuse and
neglect” (p. 94). In reality, “the child-welfare system is a late-in-the-day
mechanism for dealing with the effects of poverty” (p. 94). By the time the
state gets involved, the threat of losing custody looms large, and interven-
tions are mostly ineffective. Treatment is primarily one size fits all and is
vastly underfunded, which virtually guarantees its failure (p. 100).
Structural family law also fails by undermining low-income families.
Take, for example, child-support laws (p. 102). Single parents receiving wel-
fare are obligated to assign their right to child support to the state regardless
of the absent parent’s ability to pay (pp. 102–04). These rules undermine
shared parenting by exacerbating conflict. In addition, in the case of incar-
cerated parents, child-support debt continues to accrue during imprison-
ment (p. 104). This makes it even harder for that parent to achieve stability
after incarceration. In all these ways, structural family law undermines the
family’s ability to flourish.
Huntington’s propositions flow directly from her critique. For private
family-law disputes, she endorses high-quality mediation because “it has
been shown to improve long-term psychological adjustment and post-di-
vorce family relationships, particularly between noncustodial parents and
their children” (p. 131).
Applying the same principles to child welfare, Huntington rejects a
rights-based framework in favor of fostering “collaboration between the
state and families” (p. 132). As she frames it, “a rights-based model leads to
an adversarial process, whereas a problem-solving model leads to a collabo-
rative process, which is better suited to serving the interests of both parents
and children” (p. 132). Huntington offers two primary examples. The first is
family group conferencing and the second is using problem-solving courts
for child-welfare cases (pp. 132–37). There is much that is very good in
family group conferencing, at least as it apparently operates in New Zealand.
In that model, decisionmaking authority is largely transferred out of the
hands of professionals and state actors and into the hands of extended fam-
ily and community. In the same mode, Huntington endorses the model em-
bodied in the Miami Child Well-Being Court, in which “[mental health]
experts, the family, and the court then work together as a team to protect
the child and respond to what led the family into court in the first place” (p.
139).
Huntington’s normative vision for structural family law represents per-
haps the book’s greatest contribution. It begins with a discussion of liber-
alism, privacy, autonomy, and rights. Building on the work of scholars like
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Jennifer Nedelsky4 and Maxine Eichner,5 as well as on her proof in Part I of
the book, Huntington endorses a radically reconfigured notion of auton-
omy. In place of its traditional form—autonomy as existence apart from the
state—Huntington compellingly proves both that families need the state and
that the state needs families. Rather than accepting that the two can stand
apart from each other, Huntington endorses Nedelsky’s relational theory of
autonomy. In applying this theory to her own arguments, Huntington writes
that “[m]utual dependency still has a place for autonomy, but it is not the
autonomy idealized as no need for others” (p. 152). Instead, mutual depen-
dency understands autonomy as the capacity for self-governance (p. 152).
“Relationships are not antithetical to self-governance but instead are essen-
tial to it” (p. 152).
To realize this vision, Huntington argues for significant reform. Her or-
ganizing principle is clear. If a legal rule, a legal structure, or a government-
funded program will strengthen relationships and improve outcomes for
kids, then it is part of flourishing family law. Huntington readily acknowl-
edges that she raises difficult policy questions, and she does not purport to
solve all of them (p. 155). But she argues persuasively that the question of
the quality and importance of the relationship to the child should control,
rather than a historically constrained notion of what a family ought to be
(pp. 155–56).
To strengthen families, the state should also foster long-term commit-
ment between parents. But in contrast to many proposals regularly issuing
from the Right, Huntington makes clear that she is not endorsing marriage
as a panacea for poverty. Instead, she relies on compelling data, from both
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study and the widely cited work of
Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas, to argue that low-income parents are in
fact strongly invested in establishing and maintaining their families (pp.
194–95).
Relying on this data, Huntington supports interventions that are a far
cry from mere marriage promotion. To support long-term commitment be-
tween low-income parents in particular, the state should address the struc-
tural impediments facing poor communities, including the “high
incarceration rate, particularly of low income, African American men” (p.
175). In addition, “[p]olicies that focus on improving the employment pros-
pects of low-income parents and increasing the value of work” all fall within
her ambit (p. 175). So does significant restructuring of economic-support
systems (p. 174). Huntington advocates eliminating “the kinds of support
programs that benefit only middle- and upper-income families” and replac-
ing them “with one overall subsidy to all families, regardless of income” (p.
176). These are proposals that the Left has long endorsed. As Huntington
4. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy,
and Law 123–24 (2011).
5. See generally Maxine Eichner, The Supportive State: Families, Government,
and America’s Political Ideals (2010).
April 2015] Flourishing Rights 1067
persuasively argues in her final chapter, however, emphasizing positive rela-
tionships provides a new and perhaps more politically appealing rationale
for endorsing these reforms.
Finally, states must support parents in fostering child development. On
the issue of teen pregnancy, Huntington rejects abstinence programs, which
have repeatedly been shown to have little effect (pp. 185–86), in favor of
programs like the Teen Outreach Program, which “does not focus on teen
pregnancy per se but . . . focuses on the social and emotional growth of the
students” (p. 186). For new parents, Huntington advocates strong, voluntary
programs like the Nurse Family Partnership. “[T]he [program] is a resound-
ing success, dramatically lowering rates of child abuse and neglect, increas-
ing mothers’ participation in the workforce, and improving educational
outcomes for children . . .” (p. 166). It is, for Huntington, a perfect example
of flourishing structural family law because “it helps forge a strong attach-
ment between parents and children, rather than simply reacting after parents
fail to do so” (p. 189).
Failure to Flourish concludes by turning squarely to the question of
politics. Huntington argues, quite convincingly, that focusing on relation-
ships rather than autonomy or state intervention will allow actors across the
political spectrum to embrace flourishing family law.
II. Poverty, Race, and Hyperregulation
Failure to Flourish presents an important reformulation of the relation-
ship between families and the state. It insists both that we have a universal
vision and that we remain conscious of the specifics of race, class, and gen-
der as we test and implement that vision’s central ideas. Huntington takes
great care in this project and repeatedly makes clear that she remains con-
scious of some of the most difficult aspects of this endeavor. Although there
are many points in this book that merit a careful response, here I want to
respond directly to one of the most difficult facets of Huntington’s universal
project: its applicability to those in poverty. On this topic, I reframe and
endorse much of what Huntington envisions but diverge from her on the
role of rights. Centering rights, defined broadly, would better protect the
autonomy of poor families and would ensure that these families receive au-
tonomy-enhancing support. Using a rights framework would also provide
grounds for an argument that we must not only implement good programs
but also radically restructure those parts of the social-welfare state currently
targeting poor communities.
Huntington is right about many things. She is right that families of all
classes receive substantial support from the state. Invoking Mettler, she is
absolutely right that the structure of support varies significantly by class.
And she is right that the social-welfare state in general and child-welfare
agencies in particular provide far too little support and are extraordinarily
punitive. But even as Huntington is right about these matters, she fails to
highlight the critical link between support and punishment at the heart of
American poverty policy.
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Assistance in poor communities currently comes at great risk to those
who seek it. And in a clear manifestation of structural racism and classism,
those risks are heightened if the person seeking help is poor and African
American. Elsewhere I argue that the relationship between social support
and poor communities is best described as hyperregulatory, which means
that “its mechanisms are targeted by race, class, gender, and place to exert
punitive social control over poor, African-American women, their families,
and their communities.”6 Some data about what happens when poor preg-
nant women seek health care provide a particularly clear example of
hyperregulation.
When poor women in general and poor African American women in
particular seek health care during their pregnancy, they expose themselves to
a highly intrusive state. Take, for example, a program that Huntington also
criticizes: the Prenatal Care Assistance Program (“PCAP”) in New York City.
Khiara Bridges performed an extensive ethnographic study of that program.7
As she documents, a PCAP client must provide extensive personal informa-
tion to a wide variety of professionals about subjects ranging from her diet,
her income, her history with child-welfare agencies, her immigration status,
her mental-health history, her relationship history, any history of violence,
her use of contraception, and her parenting plans—all well before she has
access to this support. Through these mechanisms, “poor women’s private
lives are made available for state surveillance . . . and they are exposed to the
possibility of punitive state responses.”8
Exposure to those regulatory systems creates a serious punitive risk, par-
ticularly and disproportionately for poor African American women.9 This
plays out quite clearly when women are suspected of using drugs while preg-
nant. To understand this disproportionate risk, it is important first to know
that African American pregnant women are no more likely to use drugs
during pregnancy than white women.10 One study in fact revealed that a
slightly higher percentage of white pregnant women (15.4%) than black
pregnant women (14.1%) test positive for drugs. Similarly, poor women are
no more likely to use drugs than women who are not poor.11 Despite the
6. Bach, supra note 2, at 322. The term “hyperregulation” is derived from Loı̈c Wac-
quant’s framing of the carceral state as characterized not by mass incarceration but by hyper-
incarceration. The prefix “hyper,” in both formulations, is meant to suggest the means by
which systems collectively target communities by race, class, and place. Loı̈c Wacquant, Class,
Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, Daedalus, Summer 2010, at 74, 78–79; see
also Gustafson, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 Harv. J.L. & Gender 113
(2011).
8. Id. at 131.
9. For a far more extensive discussion of these phenomena, see Bach, supra note 2.
10. Bach, supra note 2, at 357 (citing Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug
or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 New Eng. J. Med. 1202, 1203–04 (1990)).
11. Id. (“During a one-month period the researchers obtained a urine sample from
‘every woman who enrolled for prenatal care . . . at each of the five Pinellas County Health
Unit clinics and from every woman who entered prenatal care . . . at the offices of each of 12
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essentially equivalent rates of drug use, African American women are far
more likely to be tested for drugs when seeking prenatal and birthing care.
One revealing study focused on the rates of drug testing in a hospital that
had detailed (race-blind) protocols to determine when infants should be
drug tested. The researchers sought to determine whether “race was used as
a criterion for screening infants for intrauterine cocaine exposure.”12 They
examined the records of 2,121 mother–infant pairs and controlled for “stan-
dard screening criteria and income, insurance status, and maternal educa-
tion.”13 The researchers concluded that “race remained independently
associated . . . with drug screening.”14 “Infants born to black mothers were
more likely than those born to white mothers to have screening performed
whether they met screening criteria . . . or did not.”15 Of the women and
infants who met the relevant screening criteria, 35% of infants born to black
mothers were tested while only 13% of infants born to white mothers were
tested.16
African American women are also far more likely to be referred to child-
protection services, to suffer worse outcomes once that referral is made, and
to face prosecution related to their drug use. As to rates of referral, despite
equivalent rates of drug use, pregnant African American women are between
four17 and ten times18 more likely to be referred to authorities. Once these
women are referred, their children remain in the system longer, experience
worse outcomes, and receive inferior services.19 And these same women face
heightened punitive consequences in the criminal-justice system. In one
study that focused on the prosecution of pregnant women stemming from
private obstetrical practices in the county.’ In total they obtained a sample from 715 women.
Of the 715 women, 14.8% tested positive for alcohol, cannabinoids (marijuana), cocaine or
opiates. A slightly higher percentage of white women (15.4%) than black women (14.1%)
tested positive. As to socioeconomic status, which the researchers determined from the eco-
nomic demographics of the zip code in which women lived, the researchers concluded that
‘socioeconomic status . . . did not predict a positive result on toxicologic testing.’” (quoting
Chasnoff et al., supra note 10, at 1203–04)).
12. Marc A. Ellsworth et al., Infant Race Affects Application of Clinical Guidelines When
Screening for Drugs of Abuse in Newborns, 125 Pediatrics 1379, 1379, 1383 (2010) (finding
that “criteria indicating that screening should be performed seemed to be selectively ig-
nored . . . for infants born to white women”).
13. Id. at 1379.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1382 tbl.3.
17. Sarah C.M. Roberts & Amani Nuru-Jeter, Universal Screening for Alcohol and Drug
Use and Racial Disparities in Child Protective Services Reporting, 39 J. Behav. Health Services
& Res. 3, 12 (2011) (finding that African American newborns are 4.1 times more likely to be
reported to child-protective services than white newborns).
18. Chasnoff et al., supra note 10, at 1204 (finding that African American newborns are
9.6 times more likely to be reported to health authorities than white newborns).
19. Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare 13–14
(2002) (documenting that African American children are more likely than white children to be
separated from their parents, spend more time in foster care, and receive inferior services).
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drug use during pregnancy, 59% of the women prosecuted were of color and
52% were African American.20 Nearly all were poor.21 Moreover, African
American women were more likely to be charged with felonies than their
similarly situated white counterparts.22
In a phenomenon I have elsewhere termed regulatory intersectionality,
this disproportionate referral and punishment is enabled through the regu-
latory structures of the social-welfare, child-welfare, and criminal-justice
systems.23 Federal and state law and regulatory structures often mandate and
facilitate reporting. Social workers and health-care personnel regularly re-
port poor women to child-protection agencies, even when the law suggests
that they should not. Prosecutors rely on information gathered in social-
welfare and child-welfare settings to make their case against poor women.24
In light of this disturbing data, as well as the extraordinarily punitive nature
of much of the social- and child-welfare systems themselves,25 it is no sur-
prise that these systems are viewed with profound distrust in poor
communities.
The question, though, is what this means for Huntington’s project. If we
start where we are—with a hyperregulatory state—and seek to build a state
that both respects autonomy and offers significant positive support, how do
we get there? I answer this question below in two parts. First, in Section
III.A, I strongly differ with Huntington on the role of rights protection in
child-welfare cases. Given the extraordinary power imbalances between poor
families and the state and given the hyperregulatory nature of multiple insti-
tutions in the lives of poor families, vigorous rights protection offers a far
better response than collaboration and problem-solving courts. When done
well, vigorous advocacy leads to precisely what Huntington seeks: auton-
omy-enhancing support. Second, in Section III.B, I move away from rights
enforcement in child welfare and toward more theoretical ground. Building
on the work of Roberts and Fineman, I argue that conceptualizing and
pressing an autonomy-enhancing right to support insists—as policy argu-
ments alone cannot—that family flourishing is unattainable for those sub-
ject to the hyperregulatory state unless we demand that key institutions are
reformed. We must, in this sense, claim a right to flourish.
III. Claiming the Right to Flourish
To speak of rights and poverty in the American context is in some ways
almost absurd. As Julie Nice extensively documents, when it comes to those
20. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant
Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public
Health, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 299, 311 (2013).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 311, 322.
23. Bach, supra note 2.
24. See id.
25. E.g., Gustafson, supra note 2, at 1 (social welfare); Roberts, supra note 19, at 16
(child welfare).
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in poverty, courts apply “no scrutiny whatsoever.”26 “Poverty Law in the
United States subsists within a constitutional framework that constructs a
separate and unequal rule of law for poor people. Across constitutional doc-
trines, poor people suffer diminished protection, with their claims for lib-
erty and equality formally receiving the least judicial consideration and
functionally being routinely denied.”27 In effect, this jurisprudence endorses
a regime where constitutional law makes significant class distinctions—ac-
cording rights to those with privilege and denying rights to the poor. In
1971, Justice Douglas noted this class distinction in his dissenting opinion in
Wyman v. James.28 His words serve as a potent reminder that we have long
differentiated the mechanisms of support by class. Those with class privilege
receive extensive support, but they are not asked to trade their dignity, au-
tonomy, or rights for that support. Those in poverty, however, regularly face
this trade-off. While Justice Douglas dissented in Wyman, the majority
found that conditioning welfare on consenting to a home inspection did not
abrogate Barbara James’s Fourth Amendment rights.29 But Justice Douglas
asked the following:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent, affluent
cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payments for not growing crops,
would not the approach be different? Welfare in aid of dependent chil-
dren . . . has an aura of suspicion. There doubtless are frauds in every
sector of public welfare whether the recipient be a Barbara James or some-
one who is prominent or influential. But constitutional rights—here the
privacy of the home—are obviously not dependent on the poverty or on
the affluence of the beneficiary. . . . [T]heir privacy is as important to the
lowly as to the mighty.30
Justice Douglas’s views, however, did not prevail, and Wyman is a prime
example of how we force poor people to trade rights for support.31 Of
course, this lack of rights is mirrored in the policies Huntington describes.
While those with class privilege are supported by the submerged state, those
in poverty are subject to a hyperregulatory state.
26. Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual
Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 Fordham Urb. L.J. 629 (2008). The phrase “no scrutiny
whatsoever” was originally penned by Justice Marshall in his dissent in James v. Valtierra, 402
U.S. 137, 145 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. Nice, supra note 26, at 629.
28. 400 U.S. 309, 330–33 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 326 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 332–33 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
31. A notable recent divergence from this trend is found in an Eleventh Circuit decision
holding that Florida’s suspicionless welfare drug testing violated the Fourth Amendment.
Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1218 (11th Cir. 2013). This
decision echoed the reasoning of the earlier decision in Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp.
2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 319 F.3d 258
(6th Cir. 2003), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003).
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But to talk of rights is not to talk solely of constitutional rights. As those
who litigate on behalf of people in poverty well know, rights can be embed-
ded in statutory and regulatory schemes. Vigorously protecting those rights
can, in some circumstances, lead to strong autonomy-enhancing outcomes.
While Huntington rejects vigorous rights protection in favor of problem-
solving courts, in Section III.A I suggest that, rather than abandoning rights,
a strategy of vigorous rights protection in public family-law cases meets the
hyperregulatory state where it is and helps families get the support they
need.
By itself, however, this proves an insufficient answer to Huntington’s
project. Justice Douglas’s dissent reminds us that there is a profound ine-
quality in the way we think about rights and support and that it is precisely
these disparities—between the submerged and the hyperregulatory states—
that can lead to programs that undermine poor families. In the face of these
significant inequities, it is essential to formulate and press rights claims. In
Section III.B, I build on the work of Roberts and Fineman and suggest that
formulating and pressing these rights claims guards against piecemeal, con-
servative implementation of Huntington’s project and lays the groundwork
to dismantle parts of the hyperregulatory state.
A. Rights Enforcement in Child-Welfare Proceedings
While Huntington argues strongly for child-welfare interventions that
would offer real support and affirm the autonomy of poor families, she oc-
casionally underestimates both the reach of punitive state mechanisms and
the vast power disparities at the heart of interactions between poor families
and the state. Take, for example, family group conferencing. Huntington de-
scribes in detail the benefits of the strongest model of such conferencing
(pp. 132–43). The ideal model vests substantial power for decisionmaking in
the hands of communities and families. This power shift undoubtedly en-
hances the autonomy of the participating families. Like the Nurse Family
Partnership, family group conferencing is strength based and family focused
(p. 139). The problem, however, is that in the United States “it is often
implemented in a modified fashion, not giving families and communities
control over the process” (p. 135). In this sense, the autonomy and dignity-
enhancing focuses drop out. Given the hyperregulatory nature of these sys-
tems in general, this is hardly surprising. In the American context, then,
families in these collaborations are left to negotiate on their own behalf with
system actors who have the power to remove their children. Families in this
context are therefore engaged in “collaborations” with fewer rights to pro-
tect them. Given the extraordinarily punitive nature of the child-welfare sys-
tem, trading rights for the benefits of a collaboration in which the family
wields little power and lacks the structural support of extended family and
community raises serious concerns.
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Problem-solving courts pose even more dangers. As Jane Spinak argues,
these reforms risk both net widening and perpetuating disproportionate ra-
cial impact.32 If services are located in courts, there is even more incentive to
draw families into the system.33 Huntington certainly understands this dan-
ger and argues that this is precisely why we need good services outside of
courts. But she ultimately comes down on the side of taking this risk (p.
140). As I detail above, though, when interventions are directed at poor
communities, we hyperregulate: we link support to punishment, and we
structure these systems in a way that is highly coercive and that dispropor-
tionately harms poor families led by African American women.34 When it
comes to poor families in general and poor families of color in particular, we
have a penchant for control and degradation. At the end of the day, judges
are judges and therefore have at their disposal a fundamentally coercive tool-
box. They order, and they punish parties for failing to comply with their
orders. Exposing more and more poor families to these coercive settings and
making participation in such settings the price of support invites more
hyperregulation. To make matters worse, not only do problem-solving
courts involve these considerable risks but tying such courts to abandoning
rights leaves families even more vulnerable.
But it does not have to be that way. It turns out that vigorously protect-
ing rights can further Huntington’s aims. Today, in the best form of rights
protection in child-welfare proceedings, clients are demanding precisely
what Huntington seeks: the right both to receive autonomy-conferring sup-
port and, at the same time, the right to be protected against inappropriate
state action. Endorsing this form of rights protection and rights claiming
meets the system where it is and balances the power differential between
poor families and the state. It can also ensure that families receive actual
support.
To make this more concrete, consider the work of the Center for Family
Representation (“CFR”), an organization founded in 2002.35 CFR’s mission
sounds a lot like Huntington’s: to keep families together.36 But while Hunt-
ington puts her faith in collaboration and problem solving, CFR focuses on
vigorous, multidimensional rights advocacy. CFR has two contracts with
New York City to represent over 1,000 new parents each year in child-pro-
tective cases in Queens and Manhattan Family Courts.37 The organization’s
32. Jane M. Spinak, A Conversation About Problem-Solving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. Md. L.J.
Race Religion Gender & Class 113, 131–32 (2010).
33. Id.
34. See supra Part II.
35. For a detailed discussion of CFR’s work and model, see generally Martin Guggen-
heim & Susan Jacobs, A New National Movement in Parent Representation, Clearinghouse
Rev., May–June 2013, at 44, 45–46.
36. Center for Fam. Representation, http://www.cfrny.org (last visited Aug. 23,
2014).
37. Email from Susan L. Jacobs, Exec. Dir. & President, Ctr. for Family Representation,
to Wendy A. Bach, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Tenn. Coll. of Law (Mar. 12, 2014, 5:12
PM) (on file with author).
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open caseload includes over 2,100 parents with more than 5,000 children.38
Ninety-two percent of its clients are people of color.39 And CFR’s outcome
data is impressive. While in 2012 the average stay in foster care in New York
City was 6.8 months,40 the average stay for a child whose parents were repre-
sented by CFR was 2.5 months.41 Moreover, more than 50% of children in
families represented by CFR never enter foster care at all.42 These outcomes
are admirable.43
CFR accomplishes these impressive results in large part through use of a
three-person team that exemplifies an autonomy-enhancing form of rights
protection. Each CFR client gets a lawyer, a social worker, and, whenever
needed, a parent advocate.44 The attorney represents the parent in court. The
social worker “helps the client access stabilizing services, such as housing,
employment training, drug treatment, and domestic violence counseling.
Together with the lawyer, the social worker helps shape the formal services
plan that is endorsed by the agency and the court.”45 Finally, the parent
advocate is “a trained professional who has experienced the child welfare
system and can empathize with the struggles vulnerable families face.”46 The
advocate “provides emotional support and helps the client engage in ser-
vices, ensuring follow through.”47
Various forms of rights protection are inherent in this model. CFR’s
clients clearly have fundamental rights to family autonomy. In the face of
claims of abuse or neglect that fail to meet constitutional and statutory stan-
dards, it is appropriate to move to dismiss, and CFR’s lawyers strongly pro-
tect these rights. As Huntington notes, children exposed to foster care suffer
from high rates of posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, social phobia,
panic syndrome, and anxiety disorders (p. 94). Moreover, as Roberts exten-
sively documents, virtually every foster-care effect is worse for African
38. Id.
39. Our Families, Center for Fam. Representation, http://www.cfrny.org/our-families
(last visited Aug. 23, 2014).
40. City of New York, Mayor’s Management Report 103 (2013), available at http://
www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/mmr2013/acs.pdf.
41. Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 35, at 46.
42. Id.
43. CFR argues, quite convincingly, that these reforms also save money in the long term.
Take, for example, the savings from shortening the length of stay. In New York State, foster
care costs on average $29,000 per year. N.Y. State Office of Children & Family Servs., Ten
for 2010, at 14 (2011), available at http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/reports/vera_tenfor2010
.pdf. By significantly shortening stays in foster care and keeping other kids out of care, CFR
saves substantial public dollars. CFR has also calculated that since 2007 it has saved $223
million in combined city, state, and federal foster-care costs. Email from Susan L. Jacobs, supra
note 37.
44. Our Team Model, Center for Fam. Representation, http://www.cfrny.org/our-
work/team-model (last visited Aug. 23, 2014); Email from Susan L. Jacobs, supra note 37.
45. Guggenheim & Jacobs, supra note 35, at 45.
46. Our Team Model, supra note 44.
47. Id.
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American children.48 Given these extraordinary failures and dangers, this
traditional form of rights protection is essential.
But what about the cases where the agency’s intervention meets the con-
stitutional and statutory standards for such an intervention? CFR’s version
of rights protection plays a crucial role here, insisting that the state actually
provide the support the families need. Huntington is absolutely right that
many of these families, like all families, need support. But in the vast major-
ity of cases, the help offered “consists of little more than boilerplate plans”
and is “largely ineffective” (p. 95). Vigorous on-the-ground statutory- and
procedural-rights protection can address this fundamental problem. The
federal Adoption and Safe Families Act provides that, in order to receive
assistance, states must enact a plan that comports with federal requirements.
In these plans, states must guarantee that they will, in all but the most egre-
gious cases (for example, those involving murder), make “reasonable ef-
forts . . . to preserve and reunify families.”49 Under this duty, “prior to the
placement of a child in foster care, [the state must make reasonable efforts
to] prevent or eliminate the need for removing the child from the child’s
home.”50 The Act also requires the state to make reasonable efforts to “make
it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s home.”51 In the vast
majority of cases, parents are represented by overburdened, underpaid
counsel who lack assistance from social workers and parent advocates. Hunt-
ington is right that a lawyer in that position has little chance of forcing the
agency to move beyond boilerplate plans to do something that might actu-
ally help. With the involvement of a well-resourced defense team, however,
the agency’s duties to make reasonable efforts to prevent removal and ensure
return can look different. Working as a team, parents, lawyers, social work-
ers, and parent advocates can more effectively force the agency to craft a
plan that responds to families’ actual needs. In place of boilerplate plans, a
multidisciplinary team’s vigorous advocacy can help families actually get the
assistance they need to care for their children. With the support of social
workers and parent advocates, families can better identify the type of assis-
tance that would actually help them. And the presence of lawyers in court
who can point out the agency’s failure to make reasonable efforts helps fam-
ilies by forcing the agency to provide more robust support. This kind of on-
the-ground rights protection offers some glimmer of flourishing rights—
both vigorous protection of the right to family integrity and a mechanism to
demand the help that families need.
If we were fully to implement the best model of family group conferenc-
ing, the role of the team might at times shift to supporting family- and
community-conceived solutions. But even in that context, parents would
still benefit from the significant resources that the CFR model offers, re-
sources that could help parents repair and build the strong positive families
48. Roberts, supra note 19, at 13–14.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2012).
50. Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(i).
51. Id. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii).
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that Huntington seeks. CFR’s model certainly protects rights in the tradi-
tional sense, but the model also demands appropriate support. In a world
where poor children and families rarely see their rights protected or receive
the support they need, CFR’s expansive view of rights protection meets the
system where it is and supports families.
B. Family Flourishing and Theorizing Rights
Although she does not explicitly acknowledge this, Huntington’s project
contains within it proposals that go to the heart of class, race, and gender
privilege in America. Take, for example, the following sentence: “If the single
mother had a job with decent wages that provided benefits such as sick
leave, and if she also had access to guaranteed child support and a child
allowance, then it would be somewhat easier to provide her children with
strong, stable, positive relationships” (p. 98). In the course of this one sen-
tence, Huntington attacks the wage structure and the lack of affordable child
care and, in effect, argues for a universal child allowance. These are no small
changes, and each one represents, to say the least, a substantial political chal-
lenge to the systems that maintain class, race, and gender privilege. Simi-
larly, Huntington argues that we cannot achieve flourishing family law
without reforming child-support policies that punish poor fathers (p. 104)
and without addressing mass incarceration (p. 47). She also contends that
funding schools through the local tax system fails to allow a family to flour-
ish (pp. 38–39), an argument that challenges a key feature of the way in
which the education system perpetuates class privilege. While Huntington
distinguishes herself from both the Left and the Right, her proposals in fact
represent a substantial and quite radical set of systemic challenges.
Similarly, by endorsing autonomy-enhancing support for poor families,
Huntington challenges a long and devastating history of social-control
mechanisms within poverty programs. The division between poverty pro-
grams and other forms of support stems at least from the New Deal,52 and it
was repeatedly reinforced and racialized in particular ways during and after
the War on Poverty.53 This history has produced a fundamental split in the
mechanisms of social support. As I argue above, for those with privilege, we
provide support in a form that enhances autonomy, but for the poor we link
support to degradation and punishment. This bifurcation reinforces privi-
lege both by providing largely invisible support to the economically privi-
leged and by subordinating those in poverty. Challenging this bifurcation
challenges privilege.
It would be easy, in light of these challenges, to pick and choose, to
implement only those parts of Huntington’s project that are less challenging.
52. See Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of
Welfare in America 238–39 (10th ed. 1996).
53. See Jill Quadagno, The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War
on Poverty (1994).
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Consider just a few disturbing possibilities: Will we embrace problem-solv-
ing courts, with the attendant dangers of net widening and disproportionate
racial impact? Or will we be open to investing in the vigorous rights protec-
tion that addresses the power imbalance between poor families and the state?
Similarly, will we embrace family group conferencing in its less community-
centered form while leaving in place the power disparities between poor
families and the state? Will we actually dismantle the class privilege inherent
in our bifurcated system of social support? Will we continue to offer a sub-
merged form of substantial, autonomy-enhancing, rights-protecting assis-
tance to privileged families while linking meager support for poor families
to structures of subordination? Finally, and perhaps most crucially, will we
move beyond focusing only on “fixing” poor families of color and tinkering
around the edges of social-support and child-welfare systems? Or will we
instead grapple with the tremendously difficult issues of unequal education,
mass incarceration, and structural economic inequality that lie at the heart
of many of the family struggles that Huntington details?
With the exception of advocating family group conferencing and prob-
lem-solving courts—issues on which we appear to differ—Huntington
clearly does not seek these outcomes. Nevertheless, given the extraordinary
challenge to those with privilege at the heart of her most aggressive propos-
als, all of these outcomes seem quite possible. A variety of theorists, among
them Roberts and Fineman, have been framing the need for autonomy-en-
hancing support in rights terms. This framing acknowledges the great diffi-
culty of achieving positive change in the face of structural subordination and
begins to develop new language around which to organize rights claims. In
striving to achieve some of her more ambitious goals, Huntington marshals
policy arguments and data that certainly provide strong support. But they
are not enough. When one challenges privilege, attacks subordination, and
advocates for changes that would provide substantial assistance to those who
lack significant political power, rights claims are essential.
Roberts has written extensively about the devastation wrought upon
poor African American families by the child-welfare system54 as well as at the
intersections of child-welfare, social-welfare, and criminal-justice systems.55
In the face of this devastation, Roberts argues that poor women need a right
to privacy that not only offers protection from incursion but also affirmative
support.56 While this call for dignity, autonomy, and support echoes the
policy arguments in Failure to Flourish, Roberts explicitly invokes rights. As
she frames the matter, “merely ensuring the individual’s ‘right to be let
alone’ . . . may be inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy of the
poor and oppressed.”57 Indeed, a better notion of privacy “includes not only
54. See Roberts, supra note 19.
55. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 1474 (2012).
56. Id. at 1495–96.
57. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1419, 1478 (1991).
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the negative proscription against government coercion, but also the affirma-
tive duty of government to protect the individual’s personhood from degra-
dation and to facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination.”58
Although Roberts and Fineman differ in many respects, their work
comes together on the issue of autonomy-enhancing support.59 In a sweep-
ing intervention in classic liberal theory, Fineman argues that, rather than
imagining the traditional autonomous subject, we should think of the
human subject as inherently vulnerable, inherently in need.60 Although we
may be more or less vulnerable at different moments in life, each of us has
needs that we cannot meet alone. In Fineman’s analysis, vulnerability theory
is certainly—but not merely—descriptive. Instead, it forms the basis of a
claim that state institutions must provide support:
[C]onsideration of vulnerability brings societal institutions, in addition to
the state and individual, into the discussion and under scrutiny . . . . The
nature of human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state
must be more responsive to that vulnerability. It fulfills that responsibility
primarily through the establishment and support of societal institutions.61
For Fineman, this theory does substantial work. If the “primary objec-
tive [were] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of opportunity
and access, we may see a need for a more active and responsive state.”62 This
envisioned state would not “simply protect citizens’ individual rights from
violation by others.”63 Instead, it would “actively support the expanded list
of liberal goods by creating institutions that facilitate caretaking and human
development.”64 Such a state would also move past constrained notions of
formal equality toward a much more robust and substantive demand on
state institutions to create the possibility for real equality. The “primary ob-
jective [would be] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of
opportunity.”65
This talk of rights is admittedly ambitious, but it is also essential. It
provides a basis for insisting not only that good programs receive funding
and support but that we dismantle the hyperregulatory nature of much of
today’s social-welfare state. It demands rejecting the inequality at the heart
58. Id. at 1479.
59. For a more detailed treatment of these issues that includes not only an extensive
discussion of Fineman’s theory but also of the important work of Maxine Eichner, see Bach,
supra note 2.
60. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Depen-
dency (2004); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60
Emory L.J. 251, 257 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State]; Martha Albertson
Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. &
Feminism 1 (2008).
61. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 60, at 255–56.
62. Id. at 260.
63. Eichner, supra note 5, at 70.
64. Id.
65. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 60, at 260.
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of our bifurcated system of support. To understand this point, it is impor-
tant to revisit Huntington’s observation that a wide range of families re-
ceives support from the state. Families with class, race, and gender privilege
receive extensive support from programs like child-care deductions, high-
quality public schools, farm subsidies, and social security. As Justice Douglas
noted in his dissent in Wyman, recipients of this support would balk at any
notion that they could be forced to trade their constitutional rights for such
assistance. But what is important here is that programs like tax deductions
and high-quality public schools not only fail to interfere with traditional
negative rights. Crucially, they begin to do for privileged families precisely
what both Roberts and Fineman argue we must do for all families: they
promote the exercise of autonomy by conferring support. Such programs
also embody the exact form of relational autonomy that Huntington en-
dorses. As she frames it, dependency understands “autonomy [as] the capac-
ity for self-governance” (p. 152). In these programs for the privileged,
support is not separate from autonomy. It facilitates the exercise of
autonomy.
Of course, this could not be further from the truth for poverty pro-
grams. Poor women of color find themselves losing their children and their
freedom at the intersections of the child-welfare and criminal-justice sys-
tems. As I detail above, health services come at enormous punitive risk, par-
ticularly for poor African American women. Schools in poor communities
are far too often pipelines to prison. It is true that some programs resist
these characterizations. Programs like the Nurse Family Partnership and the
Teen Outreach Program, for example, are voluntary and nonpunitive. They
offer support while respecting autonomy, and their support in fact enables
families to exercise autonomy. But the size of these programs pales in com-
parison to the reach of the hyperregulatory state. As I argue elsewhere, the
whole gamut of poverty-focused support (welfare, food stamps, public
housing, public school, health care, and so forth) must be restructured to
confer dignity and enhance autonomy.66 Although it sounds far too glib to
put it this way, we need only to transfer the rights-protective, autonomy-
enhancing mechanisms of the submerged state into the programmatic de-
signs of poverty-focused support. Rights claims of the sort that Roberts and
Fineman envision, when combined with Huntington’s strong policy argu-
ments, might actually get us there.
Conclusion
Although this Review has focused primarily on the viability of Hunting-
ton’s project for those in poverty, I want to return here to the idea of univer-
sal solutions. I have argued above that vigorous rights protection, combined
with theorizing a right to autonomy-enhancing support, is more likely to
result in family flourishing for poor families in general and poor African
American families in particular. I have repeatedly referred to class and race
66. See Bach, supra note 2.
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divisions, and I have referred to the beneficiaries of the submerged state as
privileged. But in conclusion I want to suggest that these divisions are not
quite so stark. While families receiving benefits like social security and
home-mortgage deductions are certainly privileged when compared to those
in poverty, it is also true (as Huntington proves) that many of these families
struggle. Although these families receive substantial support and receive it in
a way that facilitates their dignity and exercise of autonomy, Huntington is
certainly right that legal institutions could do a much better job at helping
virtually all families flourish. For those families, too, rights confer dignity
and facilitate the exercise of autonomy. And Huntington’s own work, in fact,
makes this clear.
Take, for example, her discussion of gay marriage. In Huntington’s view,
gay marriage should be embraced because it strengthens relationships, which
in turn strengthen children. That is absolutely true. Entering the institution
of marriage confers a plethora of structural and economic supports. But as
Huntington so beautifully describes, it also provides more. It accords protec-
tion for the integrity of and decisions within that family, and it brings an
intangible dignitary value. What we must remember, though, is that what is
true for gay marriage is true for poverty as well. One of Huntington’s most
important contributions is revealing the many ways in which legal institu-
tions accord support, protect against incursion, and confer dignity on some
families. As should be clear from the discussion above, when we look care-
fully at the legal systems targeted at poor communities, these values could
hardly be more absent. As we move forward to implement this very impor-
tant project, insisting that legal institutions accord these rights to families
across lines of race, class, and gender opens the door to that audacious idea
that all families have the right to flourish.
